TLDR Sandbox implemented in macOS does not cover pasteboard. That blog post shows that you can create fully sandboxed malware (that may pass Apple’s review, bypassed many times in the past) stealing & modifying pasteboard values. What sandbox is? App Sandbox is an access control technology provided in macOS, enforced at the kernel level. It is designed to contain damage to the system and the user’s data if an app becomes compromised.
If you are a security-aware person, you probably use one of the secure messengers. 😏 And maybe to improve your comfort, you installed its desktop version on your mac? Sometimes we leave our computer unattended when we go to make a coffee, or we need to talk with somebody in the other room. Since we are security-aware, we always lock our screens (you do that, right?). But what if all messages sent to you will be visible on your locked mac?
In this short blog post, I will present to you why the alphanumeric password is much more secure than using biometrics. At my home, as a total n00b, I was able to clone my finger that bypassed TouchID. To be honest in my case, effectiveness was about 10%-15% - but like I wrote before, it was my first time, and I didn’t have any professional tools. Before I start, I want to credit Łukasz Bobrek & Paweł Kuryłowicz from SecuRing that showed me their research.
Hi dear readers! This year I attended my first OWASP AppSec EU both as an attendee and speaker. I really enjoyed the conference, the community-driven presentations, and 3 tracks (DevOps, Developer, CISO, Hacker). Because of my interests, I decided to follow the Hacker track. Man in contacts The first presentation that I attended on AppSec was Man in contacts by Jeremy Matos and Laureline David. The main idea was to create a malicious app that has access to your contacts (you actually give the permissions), and then all your contacts are drained to the malicious C&C.
Quicklook is a super cool mechanism allowing you to quickly check file contents without opening it in a specialized application. When you press the space bar on, for instance, *xlsx file, you can see the following preview without having MS Excel installed. While reading *OS Internals Volume I (that I highly recommend btw) I stopped on the Quicklook chapter. I found out that Quicklook registers com.apple.quicklook.ThumbnailsAgent XPC service that is responsible for ==creating thumbnails== database and storing it in /var/folders/…/C/com.
Before I start describing details, you have to know that this post is published on Responsible Disclosure terms. I sent a full report with all the findings to DASAN on 24th October 2017. We have been talking about these vulnerabilities for a long time, and one day they just stopped contacting me anymore (even when I warned them that I want to disclose this). Today is 26th April 2018, so it’s over half year after DASAN has been informed.
Not so long time ago, I submitted my presentation proposal on CONFidence’s Call For Papers. CONFidence is one of the best European IT Sec conferences that I love to attend due to very good presentations quality and hackish^H^H atmosphere ;-) This year I decided to actively attend as a speaker with my presentation about pentesting iOS apps using jailed iDevice. I sent my proposal, and when I received the approval, I visited the conference’s website in order to check if I’m included in the speakers list for sure (in SecuRing it’s common to prank your colleagues like for instance sending emails from the fake server, haha).
During my work, I was auditing a Cordova App and then I saw a plain text password right in the logs. I talked to the developer and it proved that Cordova doesn’t support Keychain by itself. One of the most popular Keychain plugins (also used by this developer) is https://github.com/ionic-team/cordova-plugin-ios-keychain. Turned out there was a forgotten NSLog call that logged all keychain entries: I have reported it and the bug is now fixed (CVE-2018-1000123).
What FreePlane is? FreePlane is an open-source application intended for creating mind maps. Vulnerability descripton: FreePlane is a Java-based app that loads its mind maps that are stored as simple XML files. The parser allowed to expand external entities that caused this vulnerability. Results: When the victim opens a maliciously crafted mind map, any accessible by Java file can be sent to the attacker. Proof of concept: Malicious mindmap: <map version="freeplane 1.