Posts List

ELECTRONizing macOS privacy

Publications This research has been presented at: DEF CON 31 - ELECTRONizing macOS privacy Objective By the Sea - ELECTRONizing macOS Privacy - a New Weapon in Your Red Teaming Armory The backstory In 2019 I wrote a blog post about injecting code to Electron apps to impersonate their TCC permissions. The trick was really simple because at that time the only thing an attacker had to do was to modify one of the Electron app’s HTML files or the whole ASAR.

Stealing macOS apps' Keychain entries

Storing secrets on the macOS is a big challenge and can be done in multiple insecure ways. I tested many mac apps during bug bounty assessments and observed that developers tend to place secrets in preferences or even hidden flat files. The problem with that approach is that any non-sandboxed application running with typical permissions can access the confidential data. For example, Signal on macOS stores a key that encrypts all your messages database in ~/Library/Application Support/Signal/config.

Abusing Electron apps to bypass macOS' security controls

After reading Adam Chester’s neat article about bypassing macOS privacy controls, I decided to share my recently discovered trick. To bypass the Transparency, Consent, and Control service (TCC), we need an Electron application that already has some privacy permissions. As it turns out, you probably have at least one such app installed - look, for example, on your desktop messengers. Especially for this post, I created a simple Electron app that has access to the camera.